Writing study: Is it Thinking or Cheating? Detecting Implicit Reward Hacking by Measuring Reasoning Effort
← ICLR 2026 oral writing corpus
Xinpeng Wang, Nitish Joshi, Barbara Plank, Rico Angell, He He · Official ICLR 2026 oral record
Figure, table and section ledger
Editorial contribution type: Empirical analysis, diagnosis & auditing (primary) · Datasets, benchmarks & measurement resources.
Layout extraction, not a required paper template. Counts are distinct caption labels; a multi-panel figure counts once. Section spans are estimated from heading positions, including floats and whitespace. Method and limitations.
- Canonical PDF
- 26 physical pages
- Before references / appendix
- ≈ 9.79 page-equivalents
- Main figures / tables
- 14 / 0
- Attached appendix figures / tables
- 17 / 2
- Attached appendix span
- ≈ 12.89 page-equivalents
Section-by-section lengths and source pages
The title/abstract/front matter precede the first numbered heading. A span ends at the next detected top-level heading, not at the last sentence; end-page whitespace is included. References and statements are listed separately. These are not measurements of text-only or artwork area.
| Top-level heading | Starts on PDF page | Estimated span | Share of entire PDF |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 INTRODUCTION | 1 | ≈ 0.87 pp. | 3.35% |
| 2 PROBLEM STATEMENT | 2 | ≈ 0.57 pp. | 2.19% |
| 3 TRAINING REWARD HACKING MODELS | 3 | ≈ 1.55 pp. | 5.96% |
| 4 TRACE: TRUNCATED REASONING AUC EVALUATION | 4 | ≈ 3.48 pp. | 13.38% |
| 5 CASE STUDY: DEBUG TRAINING ENVIRONMENT LOOPHOLE | 8 | ≈ 0.62 pp. | 2.38% |
| 6 RELATED WORK | 8 | ≈ 0.52 pp. | 2% |
| 7 DISCUSSION | 9 | ≈ 1.29 pp. | 4.96% |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | 10 | ≈ 0.11 pp. | 0.42% |
| REFERENCES | 10 | ≈ 3.32 pp. | 12.77% |
| APPENDIX | 14 | ≈ 0.03 pp. | 0.12% |
| A TRAINING HACKING MODEL WITH DIFFERENT HINT COMPLEXITY | 14 | ≈ 1.03 pp. | 3.96% |
| B SCALING COT MONITOR | 15 | ≈ 0.5 pp. | 1.92% |
| C ADDITIONAL RESULTS ON TRUNCATION REASONING EVALUATION | 15 | ≈ 2.67 pp. | 10.27% |
| D GRPO RESULTS | 18 | ≈ 0.48 pp. | 1.85% |
| E HACKING EXAMPLES | 18 | ≈ 0.52 pp. | 2% |
| F TRAINING DETAILS | 19 | ≈ 4.76 pp. | 18.31% |
| G PROMPTS FOR LOOPHOLE INJECTION | 24 | ≈ 1 pp. | 3.85% |
| H PROMPTS FOR COT MONITORING | 25 | ≈ 0.76 pp. | 2.92% |
| I CLUSTERING SAMPLES WITH TRACE FOR LOOPHOLE DISCOVERY | 25 | ≈ 0.92 pp. | 3.54% |
| J THE USE OF LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS | 26 | ≈ 0.21 pp. | 0.81% |
All detected figure and table locations
Main text
Attached appendix
- Figure 15 · p. 14
- Figure 16 · p. 14
- Figure 17 · p. 15
- Figure 18 · p. 16
- Figure 19 · p. 17
- Figure 20 · p. 17
- Figure 21 · p. 18
- Figure 22 · p. 18
- Figure 23 · p. 19
- Table 1 · p. 19
- Table 2 · p. 19
- Figure 24 · p. 20
- Figure 25 · p. 21
- Figure 26 · p. 22
- Figure 27 · p. 23
- Figure 28 · p. 24
- Figure 29 · p. 24
- Figure 30 · p. 25
- Figure 31 · p. 26
Argument and organization
- Hidden shortcut problem and controlled environments
Distinguishes explicit from implicit hacking, then defines injected loopholes, trained policies and counterfactual labels.
- Effort proxy and detection tests
Explains forced early answers and evaluates both mixed-policy and single-policy detection.
- Discovery demonstration and limitations
Separates a clustering application from discussion of calibration, overthinking, monitor scale and adaptive optimization.
Problem, claim and contribution
The paper turns the mismatch between plausible explanations and shortcut answers into an operational question: how early can a truncated trace already earn proxy reward?
Sections 1–2, pages 1–3. · Main paper
Argument and section order
Defining hacking models and counterfactual sample labels before introducing the detector helps distinguish training access, observed reward and actual sample-level exploitation.
Sections 3.2 and 4, pages 4–5. · Main paper
Figures, captions and visual explanation
Figure 5 places truncation points on a reasoning timeline, branches to forced-answer samples and then shows reward estimates. The adjacent worked example connects this mechanism to a misleading self-correction trace.
Figures 5–6, page 5. · Main paper
Tables, comparisons and evidence
Detection plots separate task, loophole and model size; Figure 8 juxtaposes reward and TRACE against length and KL controls. The omitted no-CoT coding model is explicitly explained instead of silently dropped.
Figures 8–10 and Section 4.1, page 6. · Main paper
Appendix and reproducibility
Training tables and exact monitoring/discovery prompts support replication. The discovery prompt already tells the judge that hacking cases typically contain initial hints, so the demonstration is not a fully blind discovery test.
Appendix F, page 19; Appendix I, Figure 31, page 26. · Main paper
Clarity and writing conventions
The discussion explicitly identifies overthinking, initial-policy hacking and optimization against the score as limitations. Example consistency also needs attention: Figure 24 pairs a horse/chessboard prompt with a no-hint response about cube triangles.
Section 7, pages 9–10; Figure 24, page 20. · Main paper
What to reuse—and what not to infer
Transferable lesson: Define labels and counterfactual controls before presenting a detector; explain its intervention with a timeline, show competing diagnostic signals, and keep discovery demonstrations separate from validated detection claims.
Boundary: TRACE is a reward-versus-truncation AUC, not AUROC or a direct measurement of cognition. Synthetic loopholes, successful-response selection, extra sampling and initial-policy calibration limit generalization; high scores can also arise from overthinking, and the discovery prompt supplies a prior about hints.
Apply this lesson using the argument and evidence worksheet.
Inspection record and sources
- Checked
- 2026-09-19
- Reading status
- Full text + selected visuals inspected
- Main text
- Pages 1–10, Sections 1–7, conclusion and acknowledgements; references on pages 10–13.
- Appendix / supplement
- Pages 14–26, Appendices A–J: hint complexity, monitor scaling, extra results, GRPO, examples, training settings, full prompts and clustering algorithm.
- Visually inspected PDF pages
- 5, 6, 19, 20