Writing study: Steering the Herd: A Framework for LLM-based Control of Social Learning
← ICLR 2026 oral writing corpus
Raghu Arghal, Kevin He, Shirin Saeedi Bidokhti, Saswati Sarkar · Official ICLR 2026 oral record
Figure, table and section ledger
Editorial contribution type: Theory & formal foundations (primary) · Empirical analysis, diagnosis & auditing.
Layout extraction, not a required paper template. Counts are distinct caption labels; a multi-panel figure counts once. Section spans are estimated from heading positions, including floats and whitespace. Method and limitations.
- Canonical PDF
- 38 physical pages
- Before references / appendix
- ≈ 10.19 page-equivalents
- Main figures / tables
- 2 / 0
- Attached appendix figures / tables
- 3 / 1
- Attached appendix span
- ≈ 23.9 page-equivalents
Section-by-section lengths and source pages
The title/abstract/front matter precede the first numbered heading. A span ends at the next detected top-level heading, not at the last sentence; end-page whitespace is included. References and statements are listed separately. These are not measurements of text-only or artwork area.
| Top-level heading | Starts on PDF page | Estimated span | Share of entire PDF |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 INTRODUCTION | 1 | ≈ 1.4 pp. | 3.68% |
| 2 RELATED WORK | 3 | ≈ 1.16 pp. | 3.05% |
| 3 SOCIAL LEARNING MODEL | 4 | ≈ 2.04 pp. | 5.37% |
| 4 OPTIMAL ALTRUISTIC POLICIES | 6 | ≈ 0.92 pp. | 2.42% |
| 5 OPTIMAL BIASED POLICIES | 7 | ≈ 1.19 pp. | 3.13% |
| 6 EVALUATION VIA LLM-BASED SIMULATION | 8 | ≈ 2 pp. | 5.26% |
| 7 CONCLUSION | 10 | ≈ 0.68 pp. | 1.79% |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | 11 | ≈ 0.09 pp. | 0.24% |
| REFERENCES | 11 | ≈ 3.91 pp. | 10.29% |
| A APPLICATIONS ELABORATED | 15 | ≈ 0.62 pp. | 1.63% |
| B SOCIAL LEARNING DYNAMICS | 15 | ≈ 2.67 pp. | 7.03% |
| C PROOFS | 18 | ≈ 15.04 pp. | 39.58% |
| D EXTENSION TO HETEROGENEOUS AGENT PREFERENCES | 33 | ≈ 0.86 pp. | 2.26% |
| E EXPERIMENTS | 34 | ≈ 4.71 pp. | 12.39% |
All detected figure and table locations
Main text
Attached appendix
Argument and organization
- Concrete mediation example, explicit information model and optimal policies
Moves from recommendation scenarios to binary-state Bayesian social learning, then distinguishes altruistic and biased planners.
- LLM simulation as a comparison with analytical behavior
Separates deviations from Bayesian updating, planner-policy structure and welfare consequences.
Problem, claim and contribution
The restaurant example explains why an informative message affects both the current decision and future observers. This makes an information externality understandable before introducing value functions.
Introduction, pages 1–2. · Main paper
Argument and section order
Theorems are followed by prose describing policy regimes; the biased case explicitly acknowledges that a supremum may require epsilon-optimal rather than attained policies.
Sections 4–5, pages 6–8. · Main paper
Figures, captions and visual explanation
Figure 1 distinguishes planner, agent and oracle with colored roles and routes precision, messages and actions through a shared history. Its companion plot contrasts LLM and Bayesian belief changes.
Figure 1, page 8. · Main paper
Tables, comparisons and evidence
Figure 2 separates policy shape, deviation distribution and welfare/expenditure, using line style for objectives and color for planner type. Captions state the fixed adverse-world setting.
Figure 2, page 9. · Main paper
Appendix and reproducibility
The proof appendix includes an annotated three-tree construction. Experiment details disclose synthetic car facts, profile generation, exact prompts and an additional oracle-precision check.
Figure 3, page 22; Appendix E, pages 34–38. · Main paper
Clarity and writing conventions
Remark 2 lists restrictive information and transparency assumptions directly in the main text, while the conclusion acknowledges that LLM-agent simulation has not replaced human validation.
Remark 2, page 6; conclusion, page 10. · Main paper
What to reuse—and what not to infer
Transferable lesson: When connecting a formal model to LLM simulations, visualize the information available to each role and report systematic departures from the theoretical agent assumptions.
Boundary: These are synthetic EXAONE simulations, not measured human welfare effects. An LLM rating a message's intended precision is not the same as empirically verifying a binary channel's accuracy. Also reconcile the discounted theoretical objective with the displayed planner prompt and the appendix's discount-factor value of 1 before reproduction.
Apply this lesson using the argument and evidence worksheet.
Inspection record and sources
- Checked
- 2026-09-19
- Reading status
- Full text + selected visuals inspected
- Main text
- Pages 1–10, Sections 1–7; acknowledgments and references on pages 11–14.
- Appendix / supplement
- Pages 15–38, Appendices A–E: applications, complete belief-update derivation and policy proofs, heterogeneous-agent extension, experimental prompts, oracle checks and trajectories.
- Visually inspected PDF pages
- 8, 9