Writing study: Reliable Weak-to-Strong Monitoring of LLM Agents
← ICLR 2026 oral writing corpus
Neil Kale, Chen Bo Calvin Zhang, Kevin Zhu, Ankit Aich, Paula Rodriguez, Christina Knight, Zifan Wang · Official ICLR 2026 oral record
Figure, table and section ledger
Editorial contribution type: Empirical analysis, diagnosis & auditing (primary) · Datasets, benchmarks & measurement resources.
Layout extraction, not a required paper template. Counts are distinct caption labels; a multi-panel figure counts once. Section spans are estimated from heading positions, including floats and whitespace. Method and limitations.
- Canonical PDF
- 56 physical pages
- Before references / appendix
- ≈ 9.71 page-equivalents
- Main figures / tables
- 5 / 0
- Attached appendix figures / tables
- 18 / 3
- Attached appendix span
- ≈ 41.89 page-equivalents
Section-by-section lengths and source pages
The title/abstract/front matter precede the first numbered heading. A span ends at the next detected top-level heading, not at the last sentence; end-page whitespace is included. References and statements are listed separately. These are not measurements of text-only or artwork area.
| Top-level heading | Starts on PDF page | Estimated span | Share of entire PDF |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 INTRODUCTION | 1 | ≈ 1.13 pp. | 2.02% |
| 2 BACKGROUND | 2 | ≈ 0.68 pp. | 1.21% |
| 3 MONITOR RED TEAMING | 3 | ≈ 2.76 pp. | 4.93% |
| 4 EXPERIMENTS | 6 | ≈ 3.76 pp. | 6.71% |
| 5 FUTURE WORK AND LIMITATIONS | 9 | ≈ 0.57 pp. | 1.02% |
| 6 CONCLUSION | 10 | ≈ 0.28 pp. | 0.5% |
| REFERENCES | 10 | ≈ 4.4 pp. | 7.86% |
| A ADDITIONAL RELATED WORK | 15 | ≈ 0.54 pp. | 0.96% |
| B LLM USAGE DISCLOSURE | 15 | ≈ 0.46 pp. | 0.82% |
| C CASE STUDY: ESCALATION TO HUMANS | 16 | ≈ 1 pp. | 1.79% |
| D MONITORING CHUNK SIZE | 17 | ≈ 1.25 pp. | 2.23% |
| E MONITOR FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS | 18 | ≈ 2.75 pp. | 4.91% |
| F LATENCY AND COMPUTATIONAL COSTS | 21 | ≈ 1 pp. | 1.79% |
| G ADDITIONAL SCALING LAW PLOTS | 22 | ≈ 1 pp. | 1.79% |
| H MRT ON BASHBENCH | 23 | ≈ 2 pp. | 3.57% |
| I ATTACK POLICIES | 25 | ≈ 7 pp. | 12.5% |
| J MONITORING PROMPTS | 32 | ≈ 4 pp. | 7.14% |
| K ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON MRT THREAT MODELS | 36 | ≈ 2 pp. | 3.57% |
| L CUA-SHADE-ARENA DETAILS | 38 | ≈ 3 pp. | 5.36% |
| M EXECUTION DETAILS | 41 | ≈ 0.43 pp. | 0.77% |
| N MODEL VERSIONS | 41 | ≈ 1.57 pp. | 2.8% |
| O ATTACKER TRANSCRIPT EXAMPLES | 43 | ≈ 3.53 pp. | 6.3% |
| P MONITOR TRANSCRIPT EXAMPLES | 46 | ≈ 3.53 pp. | 6.3% |
| Q HUMAN-IN-THE-LOOP MONITORING DETAILS | 50 | ≈ 6.83 pp. | 12.2% |
All detected figure and table locations
Attached appendix
- Figure 6 · p. 16
- Figure 7 · p. 17
- Figure 8 · p. 17
- Figure 9 · p. 18
- Figure 10 · p. 18
- Figure 11 · p. 19
- Table 1 · p. 21
- Figure 12 · p. 22
- Figure 13 · p. 22
- Figure 14 · p. 23
- Figure 15 · p. 23
- Figure 16 · p. 24
- Figure 17 · p. 25
- Figure 18 · p. 26
- Table 2 · p. 29
- Figure 19 · p. 36
- Table 3 · p. 40
- Figure 20 · p. 50
- Figure 21 · p. 55
- Figure 22 · p. 56
- Figure 23 · p. 56
Argument and organization
- Monitor Red Teaming definition
Fix datasets, awareness-based threat models, evasion families, metrics, and scaffolding before comparing results.
- Numbered questions and findings
Progress from awareness and evasion to capability gaps; place the human-oversight case study in a linked appendix.
Problem, claim and contribution
The paper explicitly distinguishes offline trajectory evaluation from online intervention before presenting reliability claims, preventing a detection benchmark from silently becoming a deployment-control claim.
Section 2, page 3. · Main paper
Argument and section order
Five research questions organize six named findings, while a two-by-three awareness taxonomy isolates what the agent and monitor know from the monitoring architecture itself.
Sections 3.2 and 4, pages 4 and 6–9; Figure 19, page 36. · Main paper
Figures, captions and visual explanation
A shared miniature trajectory lets four side-by-side diagrams expose the difference between full-context, sequential, hierarchical, and averaged hybrid monitoring with very little text.
Figure 2, page 5. · Main paper
Tables, comparisons and evidence
The adversarial-results figure places AUC and low-false-positive recall alongside compact winner tables. Their disagreement is informative: better AUC does not imply the best recall at a 1% false-positive rate.
Figure 4, page 8; Section 5, pages 9–10. · Main paper
The human-study figure pairs suspicion distributions with recall bars, showing why unrestricted feedback can worsen false positives while selective escalation improves recall from 21.0% to 36.0%, a 15-percentage-point change.
Appendix C and Figure 6, page 16. · Main paper
Appendix and reproducibility
Reproduction support includes full prompts, model endpoint identifiers, retry limits, task-pair construction, annotated failure cases, and human-interface screenshots. The cost appendix openly uses estimated latency, though its caption retains placeholder wording.
Appendices F and I–Q, pages 21 and 25–56. · Main paper
What to reuse—and what not to infer
Transferable lesson: Define the threat model before the architecture, then show paired metrics and counterexamples that reveal where an apparently stronger monitor still fails.
Boundary: This is prompting-based offline oversight, not knowledge distillation or proven online safety. Preserve exact API identifiers because the prose uses nonstandard Claude 3.6 labels; do not treat the rough attention-complexity claim as measured API savings, since Appendix F reports higher hybrid token cost and estimated latency.
Apply this lesson using the argument and evidence worksheet.
Inspection record and sources
- Checked
- 2026-09-19
- Reading status
- Full text + selected visuals inspected
- Main text
- Pages 1–10, Sections 1–6; references on pages 10–14.
- Appendix / supplement
- Pages 15–56, complete Appendices A–Q: related work, disclosure, human study, chunk/ensemble analyses, failures, cost estimates, capability plots, BashBench, prompt templates, threat models, dataset/execution/model details, transcripts, and interface instructions.
- Visually inspected PDF pages
- 5, 8, 16, 21