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Writing study: LLM Fingerprinting via Semantically Conditioned Watermarks

← ICLR 2026 oral writing corpus

Thibaud Gloaguen, Robin Staab, Nikola Jovanović, Martin Vechev · Official ICLR 2026 oral record

Figure, table and section ledger

Editorial contribution type: Learning & optimization algorithms (primary) · Empirical analysis, diagnosis & auditing.

Layout extraction, not a required paper template. Counts are distinct caption labels; a multi-panel figure counts once. Section spans are estimated from heading positions, including floats and whitespace. Method and limitations.

Canonical PDF
36 physical pages
Before references / appendix
≈ 10.11 page-equivalents
Main figures / tables
2 / 3
Attached appendix figures / tables
10 / 6
Attached appendix span
≈ 19.89 page-equivalents
Before references / appendix: ≈ 28.08%References / intervening material: ≈ 16.67%Attached appendix: ≈ 55.25%Estimated layout envelopes, not text/artwork area. Unresolved appendix boundaries remain within the undivided post-body material.
Section-by-section lengths and source pages

The title/abstract/front matter precede the first numbered heading. A span ends at the next detected top-level heading, not at the last sentence; end-page whitespace is included. References and statements are listed separately. These are not measurements of text-only or artwork area.

Top-level headingStarts on PDF pageEstimated spanShare of entire PDF
1 INTRODUCTION1≈ 1.19 pp.3.31%
2 RELATED WORK2≈ 0.97 pp.2.69%
3 A ROBUST AND STEALTHY MODEL FINGERPRINTING PARADIGM3≈ 0.96 pp.2.67%
4 INSTANTIATION OF OUR FINGERPRINTING METHOD4≈ 1.72 pp.4.78%
5 EVALUATION6≈ 3.91 pp.10.86%
6 CONCLUSION & LIMITATIONS10≈ 0.21 pp.0.58%
ETHICS STATEMENT10≈ 0.14 pp.0.39%
REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT10≈ 0.54 pp.1.5%
REFERENCES11≈ 6 pp.16.67%
A OMITTED EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS17≈ 2.72 pp.7.56%
B ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS19≈ 4.04 pp.11.22%
C ABLATION ON OUR FINGERPRINTING METHOD COMPONENTS23≈ 4 pp.11.11%
D FINGERPRINT DETECTION27≈ 1.57 pp.4.36%
E ON SEMANTICALLY CONDITIONED WATERMARKS29≈ 2.85 pp.7.92%
F BROADER IMPACT AND RESOURCES32≈ 1.42 pp.3.94%
G OUR FINGERPRINT QUERIES AND REPLIES EXAMPLES33≈ 3.3 pp.9.17%
All detected figure and table locations

Argument and organization

  1. Fingerprint paradigm and instantiation

    Separates the design principle from one watermark implementation.

  2. Effectiveness, robustness and stealth

    Turns three desired properties into separately evaluated questions.

  3. Detector, ablations and examples

    Provides statistical assumptions, resource costs and qualitative trade-offs.

Problem, claim and contribution

The introduction identifies two independent weaknesses in query–key fingerprints, then replaces both with a semantic query domain and a distributed statistical signal. That parallel problem–solution structure makes the novelty easy to locate.

§§1 and 3, pp.1–4 · Main paper

Argument and section order

Algorithm 1 and the two losses distinguish watermark distillation inside the domain from distribution preservation outside it. Detection receives a separate subsection instead of being buried in training details.

§4, Algorithm 1 and Eqs.1–3, pp.4–5 · Main paper

Figures, captions and visual explanation

Figure 1 separates the threat model, prior approach and proposed design into three panels. Its green checks communicate the thesis quickly, but the accompanying caption and text must keep robustness scoped to tested deployment scenarios.

Figure 1, p.2 · Main paper

Tables, comparisons and evidence

The robustness matrix is unusually navigable because attacks are grouped by deployment stage. Nevertheless, an FSR of one summarizes five trials; the default uses 1,000 queries, so it is not a universal or low-query guarantee.

§5 setup and Tables 2–3, pp.6–9 · Main paper

Appendix and reproducibility

Figure 8 places detection strength and quality distortion beside one another. Appendix B also exposes a substantial drop in French judge scores despite nearly stable benchmark averages, preventing utility preservation from becoming an unqualified claim.

Table 4, p.20; Figure 8, p.26 · Main paper

Clarity and writing conventions

The statistical proof states independence and context-diversity assumptions, while the limitations acknowledge domain blocking and the ethics statement rejects fingerprints as sufficient ownership evidence. Those boundaries should accompany any shortened account.

§6 and ethics, p.10; Theorem D.1, pp.28–29 · Main paper

What to reuse—and what not to infer

Transferable lesson: Organize security evidence around distinct desired properties, disclose the adversary and query budget, and put the benefit–distortion trade-off beside the headline success rate.

Boundary: The detector is asymptotically calibrated under its stated assumptions, not a finite-sample unconditional guarantee. Stealth relies partly on domain secrecy, domain-specific quality can deteriorate, and the training cost is materially larger than the query–key baselines.

Apply this lesson using the argument and evidence worksheet.

Inspection record and sources

Checked
2026-09-19
Reading status
Full text + selected visuals inspected
Main text
pp.1–10, §§1–6 and ethics/reproducibility; references pp.11–16
Appendix / supplement
pp.17–36, appendices A–G, including detector proof, ablations, resources and generated examples
Visually inspected PDF pages
2, 26