Writing study: LLM Fingerprinting via Semantically Conditioned Watermarks
← ICLR 2026 oral writing corpus
Thibaud Gloaguen, Robin Staab, Nikola Jovanović, Martin Vechev · Official ICLR 2026 oral record
Figure, table and section ledger
Editorial contribution type: Learning & optimization algorithms (primary) · Empirical analysis, diagnosis & auditing.
Layout extraction, not a required paper template. Counts are distinct caption labels; a multi-panel figure counts once. Section spans are estimated from heading positions, including floats and whitespace. Method and limitations.
- Canonical PDF
- 36 physical pages
- Before references / appendix
- ≈ 10.11 page-equivalents
- Main figures / tables
- 2 / 3
- Attached appendix figures / tables
- 10 / 6
- Attached appendix span
- ≈ 19.89 page-equivalents
Section-by-section lengths and source pages
The title/abstract/front matter precede the first numbered heading. A span ends at the next detected top-level heading, not at the last sentence; end-page whitespace is included. References and statements are listed separately. These are not measurements of text-only or artwork area.
| Top-level heading | Starts on PDF page | Estimated span | Share of entire PDF |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 INTRODUCTION | 1 | ≈ 1.19 pp. | 3.31% |
| 2 RELATED WORK | 2 | ≈ 0.97 pp. | 2.69% |
| 3 A ROBUST AND STEALTHY MODEL FINGERPRINTING PARADIGM | 3 | ≈ 0.96 pp. | 2.67% |
| 4 INSTANTIATION OF OUR FINGERPRINTING METHOD | 4 | ≈ 1.72 pp. | 4.78% |
| 5 EVALUATION | 6 | ≈ 3.91 pp. | 10.86% |
| 6 CONCLUSION & LIMITATIONS | 10 | ≈ 0.21 pp. | 0.58% |
| ETHICS STATEMENT | 10 | ≈ 0.14 pp. | 0.39% |
| REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT | 10 | ≈ 0.54 pp. | 1.5% |
| REFERENCES | 11 | ≈ 6 pp. | 16.67% |
| A OMITTED EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS | 17 | ≈ 2.72 pp. | 7.56% |
| B ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS | 19 | ≈ 4.04 pp. | 11.22% |
| C ABLATION ON OUR FINGERPRINTING METHOD COMPONENTS | 23 | ≈ 4 pp. | 11.11% |
| D FINGERPRINT DETECTION | 27 | ≈ 1.57 pp. | 4.36% |
| E ON SEMANTICALLY CONDITIONED WATERMARKS | 29 | ≈ 2.85 pp. | 7.92% |
| F BROADER IMPACT AND RESOURCES | 32 | ≈ 1.42 pp. | 3.94% |
| G OUR FINGERPRINT QUERIES AND REPLIES EXAMPLES | 33 | ≈ 3.3 pp. | 9.17% |
All detected figure and table locations
Argument and organization
- Fingerprint paradigm and instantiation
Separates the design principle from one watermark implementation.
- Effectiveness, robustness and stealth
Turns three desired properties into separately evaluated questions.
- Detector, ablations and examples
Provides statistical assumptions, resource costs and qualitative trade-offs.
Problem, claim and contribution
The introduction identifies two independent weaknesses in query–key fingerprints, then replaces both with a semantic query domain and a distributed statistical signal. That parallel problem–solution structure makes the novelty easy to locate.
§§1 and 3, pp.1–4 · Main paper
Argument and section order
Algorithm 1 and the two losses distinguish watermark distillation inside the domain from distribution preservation outside it. Detection receives a separate subsection instead of being buried in training details.
§4, Algorithm 1 and Eqs.1–3, pp.4–5 · Main paper
Figures, captions and visual explanation
Figure 1 separates the threat model, prior approach and proposed design into three panels. Its green checks communicate the thesis quickly, but the accompanying caption and text must keep robustness scoped to tested deployment scenarios.
Figure 1, p.2 · Main paper
Tables, comparisons and evidence
The robustness matrix is unusually navigable because attacks are grouped by deployment stage. Nevertheless, an FSR of one summarizes five trials; the default uses 1,000 queries, so it is not a universal or low-query guarantee.
§5 setup and Tables 2–3, pp.6–9 · Main paper
Appendix and reproducibility
Figure 8 places detection strength and quality distortion beside one another. Appendix B also exposes a substantial drop in French judge scores despite nearly stable benchmark averages, preventing utility preservation from becoming an unqualified claim.
Table 4, p.20; Figure 8, p.26 · Main paper
Clarity and writing conventions
The statistical proof states independence and context-diversity assumptions, while the limitations acknowledge domain blocking and the ethics statement rejects fingerprints as sufficient ownership evidence. Those boundaries should accompany any shortened account.
§6 and ethics, p.10; Theorem D.1, pp.28–29 · Main paper
What to reuse—and what not to infer
Transferable lesson: Organize security evidence around distinct desired properties, disclose the adversary and query budget, and put the benefit–distortion trade-off beside the headline success rate.
Boundary: The detector is asymptotically calibrated under its stated assumptions, not a finite-sample unconditional guarantee. Stealth relies partly on domain secrecy, domain-specific quality can deteriorate, and the training cost is materially larger than the query–key baselines.
Apply this lesson using the argument and evidence worksheet.
Inspection record and sources
- Checked
- 2026-09-19
- Reading status
- Full text + selected visuals inspected
- Main text
- pp.1–10, §§1–6 and ethics/reproducibility; references pp.11–16
- Appendix / supplement
- pp.17–36, appendices A–G, including detector proof, ablations, resources and generated examples
- Visually inspected PDF pages
- 2, 26
- official ICLR 2026 proceedings PDF · 36 pages