Writing study: RedTeamCUA: Realistic Adversarial Testing of Computer-Use Agents in Hybrid Web-OS Environments
← ICLR 2026 oral writing corpus
Zeyi Liao, Jaylen Jones, Linxi Jiang, Yuting Ning, Eric Fosler-Lussier, Yu Su, ZHIQIANG LIN, Huan Sun · Official ICLR 2026 oral record
Figure, table and section ledger
Editorial contribution type: Datasets, benchmarks & measurement resources (primary) · Empirical analysis, diagnosis & auditing.
Layout extraction, not a required paper template. Counts are distinct caption labels; a multi-panel figure counts once. Section spans are estimated from heading positions, including floats and whitespace. Method and limitations.
- Canonical PDF
- 46 physical pages
- Before references / appendix
- ≈ 10.74 page-equivalents
- Main figures / tables
- 3 / 3
- Attached appendix figures / tables
- 7 / 10
- Attached appendix span
- ≈ 28.89 page-equivalents
Section-by-section lengths and source pages
The title/abstract/front matter precede the first numbered heading. A span ends at the next detected top-level heading, not at the last sentence; end-page whitespace is included. References and statements are listed separately. These are not measurements of text-only or artwork area.
| Top-level heading | Starts on PDF page | Estimated span | Share of entire PDF |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 INTRODUCTION | 1 | ≈ 1.82 pp. | 3.96% |
| 2 BACKGROUND | 3 | ≈ 0.87 pp. | 1.89% |
| 3 REDTEAMCUA - HYBRID ENVIRONMENT SANDBOX | 4 | ≈ 1.01 pp. | 2.2% |
| 4 ADVERSARIAL TESTING WITH REDTEAMCUA | 5 | ≈ 1.25 pp. | 2.72% |
| 5 BENCHMARKING CUAS AGAINST INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION | 6 | ≈ 2.46 pp. | 5.35% |
| 6 ANALYSIS | 9 | ≈ 0.39 pp. | 0.85% |
| 7 END2END EVALUATION | 9 | ≈ 1.24 pp. | 2.7% |
| 8 CONCLUSION | 10 | ≈ 0.51 pp. | 1.11% |
| ETHICS STATEMENT | 11 | ≈ 0.26 pp. | 0.57% |
| REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT | 11 | ≈ 0.15 pp. | 0.33% |
| LLM USAGE STATEMENT | 11 | ≈ 0.08 pp. | 0.17% |
| REFERENCES | 11 | ≈ 6.36 pp. | 13.83% |
| A LIMITATIONS | 18 | ≈ 1 pp. | 2.17% |
| B RTC-BENCH | 19 | ≈ 11 pp. | 23.91% |
| C REDTEAMCUA FRAMEWORK DIAGRAM | 30 | ≈ 1.53 pp. | 3.33% |
| D COMPARISON OF CUA EVALUATION FRAMEWORKS | 31 | ≈ 1.56 pp. | 3.39% |
| E EXPERIMENT SETUP DETAILS | 33 | ≈ 0.18 pp. | 0.39% |
| F CIA CLASSIFICATION PRINCIPLES | 33 | ≈ 0.12 pp. | 0.26% |
| G LICENSES | 33 | ≈ 0.12 pp. | 0.26% |
| H DEFENSE RESULTS | 33 | ≈ 1.87 pp. | 4.07% |
| I ADDITIONAL RESULTS | 35 | ≈ 7.61 pp. | 16.54% |
| J SYSTEM PROMPTS | 43 | ≈ 3.89 pp. | 8.46% |
All detected figure and table locations
Argument and organization
- Threat and evaluation gap
Define why hybrid web/OS use needs a realistic but isolated security benchmark.
- Sandbox and benchmark construction
Separate the reusable environment from its task and attack taxonomy.
- Decoupled evaluation, defenses, and end-to-end testing
Distinguish susceptibility after exposure from navigation and successful harmful execution.
- Appendix artifacts
Provide scenarios, prompts, evaluators, ablations, and outcome categories for reproduction.
Problem, claim and contribution
The paper defines the benign workflow, attacker control, and environmental gap before introducing the benchmark. The 9×24×4 construction makes the 864-example count interpretable rather than using scale alone as novelty.
Sections 2–4, pages 3–6. · Main paper
Argument and section order
Decoupled exposure is introduced as a diagnostic, not a replacement for realistic use. A separate end-to-end section then tests whether navigation failures were masking risk.
Sections 3.1, 5.1, and 7, pages 5–10. · Main paper
Figures, captions and visual explanation
The framework diagram separates benign/adversarial configuration and evaluators while showing their shared environment. Concrete interface screenshots anchor the abstraction, and the caption points to larger versions.
Figure 7, page 30; Appendix B.1, pages 19–22. · Main paper
Tables, comparisons and evidence
Attempt rate and execution-verified success rate distinguish willingness from capability. The manually coded outcome table further separates detection, navigation failure, incomplete execution, and successful attacks, explaining aggregate differences.
Table 1, page 7; Table 3, page 10; Appendix I.6, page 42. · Main paper
Appendix and reproducibility
The contents page supports a long, artifact-heavy supplement; full prompts, scenario examples, action translation, step budgets, and evaluator details let readers understand the experimental scaffold rather than only model names.
Page 17; Appendices B, E, and J, pages 19–29, 33, and 43–46. · Main paper
Clarity and writing conventions
Captions retain aggregation rules and metric direction. The strongest headline, however, needs the subset and denominator stated nearby: end-to-end testing is on selected high-risk tasks, not the full 864 examples.
Table 1 caption, page 7; Section 7 and Table 3, pages 9–10. · Main paper
What to reuse—and what not to infer
Transferable lesson: For an agent benchmark, explicitly separate exposure, attempted behavior, successful execution, and environmental navigation; accompany headline rates with denominators, selection rules, and concrete failure categories.
Boundary: The 50 end-to-end/defense tasks are selected for high attack success, so their rates are not population risk estimates or directly comparable to full-benchmark averages. Opus 4.5 uses 38/46, not 38/50. Operator results depend on simulated human-check handling; attempt rate uses an LLM judge. Source prompts and attack examples are research artifacts, not instructions to execute.
Apply this lesson using the argument and evidence worksheet.
Inspection record and sources
- Checked
- 2026-09-19
- Reading status
- Full text + selected visuals inspected
- Main text
- Pages 1–11, Sections 1–8 and ethics/reproducibility statements; references excluded from analytical reading.
- Appendix / supplement
- Pages 17–46, contents and Appendices A–J, including benchmark examples, comparison framework, defense and ablation results, and full agent/evaluator prompts.
- Visually inspected PDF pages
- 10, 30