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Writing study: Watch your steps: Dormant Adversarial Behaviors that Activate upon LLM Finetuning

← ICLR 2026 oral writing corpus

Thibaud Gloaguen, Mark Vero, Robin Staab, Martin Vechev · Official ICLR 2026 oral record

Figure, table and section ledger

Editorial contribution type: Empirical analysis, diagnosis & auditing (primary) · Learning & optimization algorithms.

Layout extraction, not a required paper template. Counts are distinct caption labels; a multi-panel figure counts once. Section spans are estimated from heading positions, including floats and whitespace. Method and limitations.

Canonical PDF
40 physical pages
Before references / appendix
≈ 10.11 page-equivalents
Main figures / tables
4 / 9
Attached appendix figures / tables
31 / 11
Attached appendix span
≈ 24.4 page-equivalents
Before references / appendix: ≈ 25.27%References / intervening material: ≈ 13.73%Attached appendix: ≈ 61%Estimated layout envelopes, not text/artwork area. Unresolved appendix boundaries remain within the undivided post-body material.
Section-by-section lengths and source pages

The title/abstract/front matter precede the first numbered heading. A span ends at the next detected top-level heading, not at the last sentence; end-page whitespace is included. References and statements are listed separately. These are not measurements of text-only or artwork area.

Top-level headingStarts on PDF pageEstimated spanShare of entire PDF
1 INTRODUCTION1≈ 1.07 pp.2.68%
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK2≈ 1.03 pp.2.58%
3 FAB: FINETUNING-ACTIVATED BEHAVIORS3≈ 1.77 pp.4.42%
4 EVALUATION5≈ 4.74 pp.11.85%
5 CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS10≈ 0.47 pp.1.18%
ETHICS STATEMENT10≈ 0.2 pp.0.5%
REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT10≈ 0.26 pp.0.65%
REFERENCES11≈ 5.5 pp.13.75%
A FURTHER EXPERIMENTS16≈ 15.79 pp.39.48%
B ADDITIONAL SCENARIO32≈ 0.45 pp.1.13%
C EXTENDED EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS32≈ 3.88 pp.9.7%
D PROMPTS AND TEMPLATES36≈ 2.58 pp.6.45%
E BROADER IMPACT AND RESOURCES39≈ 1.7 pp.4.25%
All detected figure and table locations

Argument and organization

  1. Threat model and method

    Separate attacker control from later user-controlled adaptation before describing the experimental method.

  2. Evaluation

    Pair three behavioral scenarios with utility measurements, then stress-test adaptation choices.

  3. Conclusion and limitations

    Separate demonstrated vulnerability from prospective detection and mitigation.

Problem, claim and contribution

The threat model distinguishes malicious model weights from poisoned user data and input-triggered backdoors. Its central novelty is the timing of activation, which the related-work section contrasts explicitly with superficially similar attacks.

§§1–3, pp.1–3 · Main paper

Argument and section order

Each scenario repeats setup then results, and attack-success tables are paired with utility tables. This reusable structure prevents behavioral activation and ordinary task quality from being conflated.

§§4.1–4.3, Tables1–6, pp.5–7 · Main paper

Figures, captions and visual explanation

The opening lifecycle diagram places the adversary, sharing platform and user in separate regions, making ownership boundaries and the before/after evaluation gap visible without requiring the optimization details.

Fig.1, p.2 · Main paper

Tables, comparisons and evidence

The robustness table names the varied setting, retains failed or weak conditions, and reports five-run variation. Its highlighted defaults help audit the extent to which the broad robustness claim depends on a favorable adaptation configuration.

Table7, §4.4, p.8 · Main paper

Appendix and reproducibility

The appendix retains full activation curves, evaluator definitions and a concrete judge failure. Excluding PubMedQA from over-refusal scoring is explained by formatting-induced judge errors, rather than silently dropping an inconvenient dataset.

Appendices A.1–A.3, C.4 and D.3, pp.16–28, 34–36, 38–39 · Main paper

Clarity and writing conventions

The limitations acknowledge model scale and substantial attacker tuning; the ethics discussion addresses misuse and restricted release. Proposed low-cost checks are presented after the empirical threat, but their observed success should not be rewritten as comprehensive defenses.

§5, p.10; Appendices A.8–A.9 and E, pp.30–31, 39–40 · Main paper

What to reuse—and what not to infer

Transferable lesson: State who controls each stage, measure the harmful behavior against an adapted benign baseline, and audit the evaluator before interpreting robustness.

Boundary: Experiments use models no larger than3B parameters, and some settings suppress activation. Utility cells allow substantial relative degradation; lack of obvious baseline change is not certified harmlessness. Utility evaluation selects the better of instruction/completion formats. The appendix's permissive-license wording includes noncommercial data, so it is not blanket reuse permission.

Apply this lesson using the argument and evidence worksheet.

Inspection record and sources

Checked
2026-09-19
Reading status
Full text + selected visuals inspected
Main text
PDF pp.1–10, §§1–5 and ethics/reproducibility; references pp.11–15
Appendix / supplement
Appendices A–E, PDF pp.16–40, including all ablation captions, evaluator prompts, example outputs and resource disclosures
Visually inspected PDF pages
2, 8