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Writing study: Is Your LLM Overcharging You? Tokenization, Transparency, and Incentives

← ICML 2026 oral writing corpus

Ander Artola Velasco, Stratis Tsirtsis, Nastaran Okati, Manuel Gomez Rodriguez · Official ICML 2026 oral record

Figure, table and section ledger

Editorial contribution type: Theory & formal analysis (primary).

Layout extraction, not a required paper template. Counts are distinct caption labels; a multi-panel figure counts once. Section spans are estimated from heading positions, including floats and whitespace. Method and limitations.

Canonical PDF
25 physical pages
Before references / appendix
≈ 9.28 page-equivalents
Main figures / tables
3 / 0
Attached appendix figures / tables
8 / 1
Attached appendix span
≈ 11.91 page-equivalents
Before references / appendix: ≈ 37.12%References / intervening material: ≈ 15.24%Attached appendix: ≈ 47.64%Estimated layout envelopes, not text/artwork area. Unresolved appendix boundaries remain within the undivided post-body material.

Source-bound correction: Join wrapped printed heading text using adjacent source lines; original heading start coordinates are unchanged.

Section-by-section lengths and source pages

The title/abstract/front matter precede the first numbered heading. A span ends at the next detected top-level heading, not at the last sentence; end-page whitespace is included. References and statements are listed separately. These are not measurements of text-only or artwork area.

Top-level headingStarts on PDF pageEstimated spanShare of entire PDF
1. Introduction1≈ 1.65 pp.6.6%
2. A Principal-Agent Model of Delegated Autoregressive Generation3≈ 1.33 pp.5.32%
3. Provider Incentives Under the Pay-Per-Token Pricing Mechanism4≈ 3.1 pp.12.4%
4. Incentive-Compatible Pricing Mechanisms7≈ 1.16 pp.4.64%
5. Discussion and Limitations8≈ 0.95 pp.3.8%
6. Conclusions9≈ 0.24 pp.0.96%
Acknowledgements10≈ 0.1 pp.0.4%
Impact Statement10≈ 0.14 pp.0.56%
References10≈ 3.81 pp.15.24%
A. Misreporting policies πm14≈ 1 pp.4%
B. Additional Experimental Details15≈ 1 pp.4%
C. Proofs16≈ 3 pp.12%
D. Additional Experimental Results19≈ 6.91 pp.27.64%
All detected figure and table locations

Argument and organization

  1. 1 Introduction; 2 Principal-Agent Model

    Turns tokenization ambiguity into a formal information-asymmetry and utility model.

  2. 3 Pay-Per-Token Incentives

    Separates misreporting incentives, worst-case optimization hardness and a feasible proof-of-concept vulnerability.

  3. 4 Incentive-Compatible Pricing; 5 Discussion; 6 Conclusion

    Characterizes a restricted mechanism family and discusses operational and modeling limits.

Problem, claim and contribution

The opening asks what incentives a pricing rule creates rather than claiming evidence that named commercial providers have committed billing fraud.

Abstract and Introduction, p.1 · Main paper

Argument and section order

The paper distinguishes worst-case hardness of optimal plausible misreporting from the existence of a profitable heuristic, then presents the alternative pricing characterization.

Sections 3.2-4, pp.5-8 · Main paper

Figures, captions and visual explanation

Paired plots separate extra billed tokens from plausibility; the utility plot marks the break-even margin and spells out sampling and prompt conditions in its caption.

Figure 1, p.5; Figure 3, p.8 · Main paper

Tables, comparisons and evidence

The principal-agent definition specifies additive pricing and GPU-energy utility accounting, making the scope of the later characterization visible before the theorem.

Section 2, p.3; Theorem 4.3, pp.7-8 · Main paper

Appendix and reproducibility

Experimental details state model versions, prompt length/language filters, five generation seeds, 90 percent intervals and isolated GPU energy measurement.

Appendix B, p.15 · Main paper

Clarity and writing conventions

The discussion explicitly notes that character-based pricing does not prevent verbosity inflation and that single-provider interactions do not cover broader market dynamics.

Section 5, p.9 · Main paper

What to reuse—and what not to infer

Transferable lesson: Distinguish an incentive vulnerability from observed misconduct, and keep theorem restrictions and cost accounting attached to a proposed remedy.

Boundary: This is not an audit of proprietary billing behavior or a complete market model; the characterization concerns additive mechanisms and leaves other forms of misreporting outside its remedy.

Apply this lesson using the argument and evidence worksheet.

Inspection record and sources

Checked
2026-10-07
Reading status
Writing-focused manuscript scan + selected visuals inspected
Main text
Writing-oriented scan of the main argument through physical p.9, with focused physical-page text inspection on 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9. Framing, section progression, mechanism/proof explanation, displays, comparison conditions and conclusions were inspected. This is not exhaustive technical reading, proof verification or reproduction.
Appendix / supplement
Appendix organization and main-text pointers were checked; focused text inspection of physical pages 15. Remaining appendix proofs and details were not exhaustively read. No separately linked supplement inspected.
Visually inspected PDF pages
5, 8

This is a writing-focused scan of the manuscript and the stated supplementary scope: framing, organization, visual explanation, evidence presentation and wording. It is not a line-by-line proof audit, reproduction of results or exhaustive scientific review.