Writing study: The Obfuscation Atlas: Mapping Where Honesty Emerges in RLVR with Deception Probes
← ICML 2026 oral writing corpus
Mohammad Taufeeque, Stefan Heimersheim, Adam Gleave, Chris Cundy · Official ICML 2026 oral record
Figure, table and section ledger
Editorial contribution type: Empirical analysis, diagnosis & auditing (primary).
Layout extraction, not a required paper template. Counts are distinct caption labels; a multi-panel figure counts once. Section spans are estimated from heading positions, including floats and whitespace. Method and limitations.
- Canonical PDF
- 30 physical pages
- Before references / appendix
- ≈ 9.4 page-equivalents
- Main figures / tables
- 5 / 4
- Attached appendix figures / tables
- 10 / 19
- Attached appendix span
- ≈ 17.91 page-equivalents
Section-by-section lengths and source pages
The title/abstract/front matter precede the first numbered heading. A span ends at the next detected top-level heading, not at the last sentence; end-page whitespace is included. References and statements are listed separately. These are not measurements of text-only or artwork area.
| Top-level heading | Starts on PDF page | Estimated span | Share of entire PDF |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Introduction | 1 | ≈ 1.33 pp. | 4.43% |
| 2. Problem Setting | 2 | ≈ 1.34 pp. | 4.47% |
| 3. Related Work | 4 | ≈ 0.32 pp. | 1.07% |
| 4. Methodology | 4 | ≈ 1.54 pp. | 5.13% |
| 5. Results | 5 | ≈ 3.43 pp. | 11.43% |
| 6. Recommendations | 9 | ≈ 0.4 pp. | 1.33% |
| 7. Conclusion | 9 | ≈ 0.3 pp. | 1% |
| Acknowledgements | 10 | ≈ 0.07 pp. | 0.23% |
| Author contributions | 10 | ≈ 0.19 pp. | 0.63% |
| Impact Statement | 10 | ≈ 0.11 pp. | 0.37% |
| References | 10 | ≈ 2.68 pp. | 8.93% |
| A. MBPP-Honeypot RL Training Without Code Length Penalty | 13 | ≈ 0.75 pp. | 2.5% |
| B. Detailed Probe Metrics by Model | 13 | ≈ 0.63 pp. | 2.1% |
| C. Per-Model Obfuscation Atlas | 14 | ≈ 0.19 pp. | 0.63% |
| D. The Policy Gradient Estimator in Probe-Penalized Training | 14 | ≈ 2.43 pp. | 8.1% |
| E. Standard RLVR Updates Model Beliefs | 17 | ≈ 0.67 pp. | 2.23% |
| F. Effect of Anti-Reward-Hacking System Prompt | 17 | ≈ 0.93 pp. | 3.1% |
| G. Effect of Extremely High Detector Coefficient | 18 | ≈ 0.68 pp. | 2.27% |
| H. Training Hyperparameters | 19 | ≈ 2.41 pp. | 8.03% |
| I. Activation Extraction Ablations | 21 | ≈ 0.75 pp. | 2.5% |
| J. Effect of Probe Dataset | 22 | ≈ 0.11 pp. | 0.37% |
| K. Effect of Probe Quality on Honesty and Capabilities | 22 | ≈ 0.88 pp. | 2.93% |
| L. Continually Retraining Detector During RLVR Training | 23 | ≈ 0.28 pp. | 0.93% |
| M. Absence of Emergent Misalignment | 23 | ≈ 0.68 pp. | 2.27% |
| N. Deception Classification Threshold Sensitivity Analysis | 24 | ≈ 0.11 pp. | 0.37% |
| O. Food-Sycophancy: Taxonomy Generalization | 24 | ≈ 1.14 pp. | 3.8% |
| P. Non-Deception Probe Stability | 25 | ≈ 0.15 pp. | 0.5% |
| Q. System Prompt for Classifying Obfuscated Policies | 25 | ≈ 0.65 pp. | 2.17% |
| R. Per-Model Capabilities | 26 | ≈ 0.12 pp. | 0.4% |
| S. Obfuscated Policies Under Generation Mean-Pooled Probes | 26 | ≈ 0.18 pp. | 0.6% |
| T. Extended Training (500 Steps) | 26 | ≈ 0.86 pp. | 2.87% |
| U. Per-Model Hyperparameter Sweep | 27 | ≈ 0.11 pp. | 0.37% |
| V. Detector Penalty Without Code Length Penalty | 27 | ≈ 3.22 pp. | 10.73% |
All detected figure and table locations
Main text
Attached appendix
- Table 5 · p. 13
- Table 6 · p. 13
- Table 7 · p. 14
- Figure 6 · p. 15
- Table 8 · p. 18
- Table 9 · p. 19
- Table 10 · p. 20
- Figure 7 · p. 20
- Table 12 · p. 20
- Figure 8 · p. 21
- Table 11 · p. 21
- Table 13 · p. 22
- Table 14 · p. 23
- Table 15 · p. 23
- Figure 9 · p. 24
- Table 16 · p. 25
- Table 17 · p. 25
- Figure 10 · p. 26
- Figure 11 · p. 27
- Table 18 · p. 27
- Table 19 · p. 28
- Table 20 · p. 28
- Figure 5 · p. 28
- Figure 12 · p. 28
- Table 21 · p. 29
- Table 22 · p. 29
- Figure 13 · p. 30
- Figure 14 · p. 30
- Table 23 · p. 30
Argument and organization
- Problem and contribution
Distinguishes response-policy obfuscation from changes in internal activations, using the same output replayed through original and trained models to separate them.
- Argument sequence
Formal reward/probe decomposition leads to operational policy labels, a hyperparameter atlas, then controls for representation drift and direct detector gradients.
- Evidence and verification
Visible versus held-out tests define the behavioral gap; ordinary RL and direct gradients through the probe are different controls, and continually retraining detectors yields no significant improvement here.
Problem, claim and contribution
Distinguishes response-policy obfuscation from changes in internal activations, using the same output replayed through original and trained models to separate them.
Figure 1 and Section 2, pp. 2-3 · Main paper
Argument and section order
Formal reward/probe decomposition leads to operational policy labels, a hyperparameter atlas, then controls for representation drift and direct detector gradients.
Sections 2-5, pp. 2-8 · Main paper
Figures, captions and visual explanation
The overview aligns concrete code outputs with two detector checks; paired diagnostic plots separate endorsement changes from activation changes under three gradient conditions.
Figure 1, p. 2; Figures 3-4, p. 8; both PNGs inspected · Main paper
Tables, comparisons and evidence
Visible versus held-out tests define the behavioral gap; ordinary RL and direct gradients through the probe are different controls, and continually retraining detectors yields no significant improvement here.
Section 4.4, p. 5; Section 5.3, p. 8; Appendix L, p. 23 · Main paper
Appendix and reproducibility
Disaggregated model/probe results and threshold sensitivity accompany no-emergent-misalignment findings and a no-code-length-penalty control, reducing reliance on one aggregate atlas.
Appendices B-C, pp. 13-16; L-N, pp. 23-24; V and Table 23, pp. 27-30 · Main paper
Clarity and writing conventions
Operational definitions make loaded labels testable, but broad honesty and capability headings need the narrow coding-task definition carried with them.
Section 4.4, p. 5; Section 5.4, p. 8 · Main paper
What to reuse—and what not to infer
Transferable lesson: Define competing failure modes through observable cross-checks, then choose interventions that distinguish incentive effects from incidental representation drift.
Boundary: Honesty is a thresholded visible/hidden-test gap in this setup, not general truthfulness; the reported safe hyperparameter region is model- and task-dependent.
Apply this lesson using the argument and evidence worksheet.
Inspection record and sources
- Checked
- 2026-10-07
- Reading status
- Writing-focused manuscript scan + selected visuals inspected
- Main text
- Writing-focused distributed manuscript scan, not exhaustive technical/proof validation. Sections 1-7, pp. 1-9: honesty/obfuscation taxonomy, objective decomposition, coding setup, probe protocol, controlled atlas and recommendations.
- Appendix / supplement
- Writing-focused appendix scan; code, data and external assets not executed. Appendices A-V and examples, pp. 13-30: model-specific metrics, policy-gradient derivation, extraction controls, detector retraining, null misalignment findings, thresholds and longer training.
- Visually inspected PDF pages
- 2, 8
This is a writing-focused scan of the manuscript and the stated supplementary scope: framing, organization, visual explanation, evidence presentation and wording. It is not a line-by-line proof audit, reproduction of results or exhaustive scientific review.